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Abstract
 
Donald Davidson’s account of meaning and mind is thought to be overly third-
personal. Its interpreter-relative treatment of thought and language neglects the
contribution that first-personal and sub-personal aspects of a speaker’s compe-
tence make to the significance of speech. However, Davidson’s own work
contains materials that point towards a more speaker-centred account of mean-
ing. I shall argue that by adding experience to Davidson’s scenario of triangu-
lation we can bridge the publicly interpretable content of a speaker’s utterances
and the immediate first-person accessibility they have to the speaker.
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[W]e all talk so freely about language or languages that we tend to
forget that there are no such things in the world; there are only speak-
ers and their various written and acoustical products. This point,
obvious in itself, is nevertheless easy to forget, and it has consequences
that are far from universally recognised.
(Davidson, 1992: p. 256)
What is it for a speaker to mean something by the sounds he emits? A natu-
ral answer is that the sounds uttered belong to the sound patterns of a
common language: a language the speaker shares with others. But for those
who, like Davidson, do not recognize the existence of common languages, a
different answer must be given. The question is pressing since all that is
acknowledged is speakers and their ‘various written and acoustical
products’, and speakers themselves are unlikely to offer much insight into
what they do. As far as most speakers are concerned, they just open their
mouths and the words come out in the right order. The words they use are
so familiar that they cannot use or hear them without their having the
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meanings they ordinarily have for them. So where should we look for an
account of a speaker meaning something by the sounds he emits?
According to Davidson, an account can be given from the point of view
of the radical interpreter. An interpreter has the task of constructing a
theory that makes best overall sense of the speaker’s behaviour, linguistic
and otherwise, in rational terms. In the radical case, the interpreter has no
prior understanding of what the speaker says: the ‘evidence must be of a sort
that would be available to someone who does not already know how to
interpret utterances the theory is designed to cover’ (Davidson, 1984:
p. 128). And the theory must make ‘no essential use of unexplained linguis-
tic concepts’ (p. 176). The linguistic part of interpreting a speaker’s behav-
iour is undertaken by constructing a recursive truth theory for his sentences
along the lines Tarski proposed for constructing definitions of truth for
formal languages. The radical interpreter’s knowledge of what the speaker’s
sentences mean is encoded by T-theorems of the form 
where ‘
 
Σ
 
’ is replaced by a structural description of a speaker’s sentence and
‘
 
p
 
’ is replaced by an interpreter’s sentence with the same truth-value. A
correct theory of truth will be one that states the conditions under which the
sentences uttered by the speaker are true. By stating the conditions of truth
for each sentence, the theory provides a way to give the meanings for all
sentences that belong to what, from a theoretical point of view, could be
called his language, or idiolect. The theory of truth thus serves as a theory
of meaning for the speaker’s utterances, and the interpretations placed on
his words are part of a larger project of making sense of his behaviour in the
light of further attitudes and actions that there are reasons to ascribe to him.
The radical interpreter only has the evidence of the speaker’s behaviour
and the surrounding circumstances to go on. However, his pronouncements
go well beyond the evidence given. Use of a truth theory to interpret linguis-
tic behaviour as intelligible speech must effect transitions from bare descrip-
tions of the audible sounds a speaker produces to semantically revealing
descriptions that assign meanings to his words and sentences. And it is in the
course of making these transitions that linguistic constructs are introduced: 
in passing from a description that does not interpret … to interpreting
description … we must introduce a machinery of words and expres-
sions (which may or may not be exemplified in actual utterances).
(Davidson, 1984: p. 126)
The resulting conception of the speaker’s language as seen through the lens
of a theory is the product of radical interpretation not the object of it.
 
2
 
 It is
(T is true in L iff ,) Σ − − p
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a theoretical conception of a language: something that gradually comes into
view as the radical interpreter makes more and more headway in making
sense of a speaker’s utterances as semantically significant. However, to
achieve this goal the theorist must show how every instance of (T) can be
proved using the resources of the theory. This is achieved by discerning a
system or pattern in the speaker’s linguistic behaviour. From the point of
view of the theory: 
We want to see the content we attribute to foreign sayings as
determined by the contributions of distinguishable parts or aspects of
foreign utterances, each of which may occur, making the same contri-
bution, in a multiplicity of utterances. This is secured by having theo-
rems deducible … from axioms which deal with simple expressions
and figure as premises in the deduction of the appropriate theorems
for any sentence in which their expressions occur.
(McDowell, 1980: p. 121)
The radical interpreter has to postulate (finitely many) axioms dealing with
each of the semantically relevant expressions the theory discerns in
L-sentences by means of suitable syntax, together with axioms that describe
the semantic upshot of combining those expressions in syntactically legiti-
mate ways. How do we arrive at the set of axioms from which to derive all
the T-sentences of what we are calling the speaker’s language or idiolect?
Which are the semantically relevant parts in any given utterance, and what
features must we assign to those parts in order to make the truth theory
work? Moreover, how can we be sure that the theory deployed by the radi-
cal interpreter postulates the right semantic structure for the speaker’s
sentences and the right semantic properties for the parts? Answers to these
questions depend, in part, on the theorist finding system in the pattern of
linguistic behaviour the speaker exhibits.
The choice of axioms and the workings of a theory of truth impose a struc-
ture on the speaker’s language. The choice of axioms is not independent of
the empirical considerations used to confirm a truth theory as interpretative
of the L-speaker’s utterances. But what empirical evidence should we
appeal to in order to confirm a candidate truth theory for a language?
Our initial data are the sentences of the language in question and the
truth-values speakers of that language take their sentences to have under
certain circumstances. Thus T-sentences are the test bed of a theory of truth
and are required simply to pair sentences of the object language with
sentences of ours alike in truth-value. Thereafter we have to discover or
impose a structure on sentences that treats them as comprising parts that
make a repeatable contribution to determining the truth conditions of
whole sentences in which they occur.
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We need to know under what conditions speakers take their sentences to
be true, and then work out for the small sample of sentences in question how
they come to have the truth conditions speakers take them to have on the
basis of their distinguishable parts and their syntactic combination. From
that point, we can use the assumption of system to generate new sentences
and assign them truth conditions that we hope to confirm by finding that
speakers of the language hold the new sentences true under the conditions
we have assigned to them in the truth theory. We need to find out which
assignments of structure to sentences and semantic properties to their parts
could have resulted in the distribution of truth-values we find among the
sentences in question. In this way, the radical interpreter will come up with
a theory of interpretation for the speaker’s utterances.
The key issue is whether the meanings the theorist assigns to the
speaker’s words and sentences are the meanings the speaker attaches to
those words and sentences. Is there a more direct account of a speaker’s
first-personal knowledge of language that can account for how linguistic
meanings are consciously apprehended by speakers and recognized to be in
play in the speech of others? Surely we want the meanings the theory assigns
to a language to be what speakers and hearers of that language would take
those words to mean.
However, by assuming the third-person perspective to be that of a
theorist, Davidson neglects the ordinary, and still third-personal, perspec-
tive of hearers who take themselves to know what others mean without
recourse to a truth theory. Davidson of course acknowledges that the point
of the radical interpreter’s project is ‘not to describe how we actually inter-
pret [one another], but to speculate on what it is about thought and
language that makes them interpretable’ (Davidson, 1995: p. 10). The
ordinary interpreter is not a theorist of interpretation. Nevertheless, the
point of the theory of interpretation is to render theoretically explicit what
the ordinary interpreter could know, which meanings he could justifiably
ascribe to a speaker’s words, on the basis of the speaker’s behaviour,
however he comes up with his interpretation.
Another complaint about the radical interpreter’s exclusive focus on the
speaker’s linguistic behaviour is that it neglects the first-person perspective
of the speaker: something we recognize in our own experience as speakers;
an immediate first-person awareness of what we mean in speaking as we do.
In this way, Davidson’s third-person epistemology of meaning appears to
leave no room for the perspective of either speaker or hearer. Instead,
Davidson attempts to capture what it is for a theorist to understand the
language. But now the worry is that without some account of the under-
standing a 
 
speaker
 
 has of what he is up to and what he takes himself to be
saying, the radical interpretation project will be unable to do justice to the
phenomena we wanted illuminated in the first place: namely, people’s
meaning something by the sounds they produce and respond to. The danger
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is that if theoretical assignments of meaning are imposed on speakers’
expressions, the meanings assigned may come apart from the meanings
speakers take their expressions to have. Thus the theory may give justifiable
construals of the sounds a speaker utters but conflict with the interpreta-
tions the speaker himself would give to his words.
The worry is familiar enough, but what is less often discussed is the
resources Davidson has to counter such objections; and, more surprisingly,
the clues his own work gives about how to fill the gaps just mentioned.
The project of the radical interpreter does place an important third-
personal constraint on the meanings we can attach to a speaker’s words.
And although I believe that Davidson seriously underestimates the contri-
butions that first-personal and sub-personal aspects of a speaker’s compe-
tence make to the linguistic significance of his speech, I think that he does
try, in discussions of triangulation, to offer a more speaker-centred account
of the speaker’s capacity to mean something by his words. I shall say some-
thing about the missing sub-personal contribution in what follows, but I
want to focus more on an experiential understanding of the first-person
perspective which I shall argue plays a fundamental role both in a speaker’s
meaning something by what he says and in his understanding of others. I
shall also show how Davidson’s own work provides pointers to such an
account.
 
1 Third-Personal Accounts of Meaning
 
When taking Davidson to task for giving a third-personal and interpreter-
relative account of linguistic meaning, we should remember that most philo-
sophical theorizing about language has tended to focus exclusively on the
outer dimension of speech. The usual approach is to imagine a theorist
observing the linguistic behaviour of members of a given community, from
the outside, and trying to figure out what meanings to assign to their words
and sentences on the basis of their utterances and the prevailing circum-
stances. And of course Davidson’s Radical Interpreter and Quine’s Radical
Translator serve as paradigm examples of such theorists. These accounts
make no room for the speaker’s inner comprehension of speech: the
conscious linguistic experience we all have in speaking and listening. Such
first-person phenomena, even if admitted, could play no role in theoretical
accounts of meaning that take as data purely third-personal observations of
linguistic behaviour. Thus an exclusively third-personal focus on the linguis-
tic community’s practice does not simply overlook a central feature of
speakers’ experience; rather the conscious phenomena of speech are
discounted on principled grounds as playing no role in linguistic theorizing.
How, it will be asked, could evidence about speakers’ immediate aware-
ness of what they mean be taken into account in assigning the correct mean-
ing to people’s words? We have no access to a speaker’s experiential states,
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and so no evidence of their inner comprehension. Of course, a speaker
could study her own language from the first-person perspective, relying on
the immediate meaningfulness her speech has for her. But such an account
would lack a virtue of these accounts: namely, the attempt to cast light on
meaning without presupposing the notion in the course of theorizing.
Another reason to discount the first-personal dimension of meaning
would be that it contained nothing of relevance beyond what we communi-
cate to others: what we mean when we speak is what we try to make avail-
able to others with whom we communicate. So no part of an expression’s
meaning can 
contain anything which is not manifest in the use made of it, laying
solely in the mind of the individual who apprehends that meaning.
(Dummett, 1978: p. 216)
If the meanings people attach to their words were items residing solely in
the minds of individuals, there would be no knowing for sure what anyone
meant by their utterances. Working out what others mean would be, as John
McDowell insists, 
a mere matter of guesswork as to how things are in a private sphere
concealed behind their behaviour.
(McDowell, 1981: p. 225)
Such a picture is utterly hopeless, running counter as it does to our everyday
experience of understanding one another. It also puts at risk the possibility
of interlocutors ever addressing the same subject matter. For this reason,
McDowell and many others conclude that 
the significance of others’ utterances in a language must, in general, lie
open to view, in publicly available facts about linguistic behaviour in
its circumstances.
(McDowell, 1981: p. 314)
 
3
 
The general conclusion from this line of reasoning is that 
when we want to understand meaning and communication we should
not turn inward, towards mental states, but outward, to what is
publicly observable.
(Follesdal, 1990: p. 98)
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Quine (1960) offers a very clear example of this, and draws appropriate
morals, telling us that meaning can only be as determinate as translation
between languages. The choice of a translation manual for a language is
fixed by the totality of behavioural evidence available to a field linguist with
no prior knowledge of the language in question. All that the field linguist
can glean from observing the behaviour of native speakers in observable
circumstances is all there can be to the linguistic significance of the words
the native speakers use.
Davidson too subscribes to the public nature of meaning, and like Quine
takes this view to have consequences for the indeterminacy of meaning and
reference: 
The semantic features of language are public features. What no-one
can, in the nature of the case, figure out from the totality of the rele-
vant evidence cannot be part of meaning.
(Davidson, 1984: p. 235)
As these quotations show, Davidson and Quine are not merely content to
demonstrate how one 
 
could
 
 know what a speaker means on the basis of
observing his linguistic and other behaviour: as if it were one way among
others. They are making much more fundamental claims about the nature
of meaning. Quine points out that ‘radical translation begins at home’, and
Davidson insists that ‘All understanding of the speech of another involves
radical interpretation’ (1984: p. 125). Each thinks that there is no more to
meaning than we can learn from the epistemology of meaning they provide.
The knowledge of meaning they are concerned with is the knowledge a
theorist has on the basis of observing behavioural evidence about a speaker.
And from these conditions under which knowledge of meaning is possible
we are meant to reach conclusions about the conditions under which mean-
ing is possible. Thus their epistemology of meaning is meant to tell us some-
thing about the nature of meaning itself: what meaning must be like in order
to be known. In this way metaphysical conclusions are drawn from episte-
mological premises.
 
4
 
 For both Davidson and Quine, the third-person epis-
temology of meaning leads to the claim that meaning is an essentially public
and social phenomenon.
 
5
 
A common motivation for these views comes from the work of the later
Wittgenstein. His stand against the possibility of essentially private mean-
ings, his view that nothing is hidden and his characterization of meaning as
use have helped to shape a widely accepted doctrine about the public nature
of language. And it is the prevalence of this doctrine that has led to the
exclusion of accounts of linguistic meaning giving priority to the first person.
However, the reasons advanced in favour of publicity do not, as I shall
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argue, rule out all first-personal accounts of meaning. First let us examine
the publicity claim a little further.
 
2 The Publicity of Meaning
 
My meaning something by my words cannot be an essentially private affair.
In so far as I succeed in communicating linguistically with others, they
know what I mean. Success depends on this, and it is because people know
what speakers mean by their words that linguistic meaning can play the role
it does in facilitating communication. What is more, the retreat to the inner,
a realm of incommunicable and private meanings, is unsustainable for
reasons that Wittgenstein advanced and that I cannot rehearse here. What
those considerations come to is the claim that one cannot by oneself stabi-
lize the meanings one attempts to confer on one’s words because one
cannot establish, at a moment, by some inner ceremony, a semantic
standard for the correct application of a word by reference to which all
future uses of the word are either correct or incorrect whatever one thinks
about its application. Rejection of wholly subjective or private meanings
for our words leads us to a publicity of meaning thesis which we can state as
follows: 
(P) All a person can mean by her words is all she can be known to
mean.
 
6
 
Thesis (P) provides a minimal constraint on the notion of meaning: it rules
out the possibility that people attach entirely subjective meanings to their
words, and provides a role for others to play in a speaker’s meaning
anything at all. However, the minimal understanding of publicity requires
only that 
 
it is possible to know
 
 what other people’s words mean it does not
speak of them being 
 
publicly displayed
 
 in facts about linguistic behaviour.
This stronger reading of publicity is often run together with the insistence
on meaning being available to others, as some of the quotations above show.
But the constraint in (P) says nothing about what makes the meanings of my
words available to others; 
 
a fortiori
 
 it does not say that it is due to meaning’s
being present on the surface of speech.
So what generates this stronger reading of publicity? We begin with the
idea of it being possible to know the meanings of other people’s words, and
advance from there to a reading of the publicity of meaning thesis according
to which the meaning of people’s words must be located on the surface of
their speech. Let us call this the 
 
exteriorizing
 
 move. The question to ask is
whether denying the essential privacy of meaning requires this stronger read-
ing of publicity; whether, that is, the exteriorizing move is warranted. There
would be reason for endorsing the exteriorizing move if failure to endorse
it left one with no alternative but the hopeless picture according to which the
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significance of another’s words were a matter of mere guesswork as to how
things stand in a private sphere. If the move to make meanings public by
locating them on the surface of speech represented the only escape from
psychologism, then we would be forced to locate linguistic significance in
speech behaviour. But so far it has not been established that this thesis does
represent the only escape from the psychologism of the hopeless picture.
Arguments for the stronger reading can be found in Quine and in the
other authors cited above. They usually hinge on the assumption that if
meanings were not located in the public sphere, did not supervene on what
is found in the public sphere, or could not be reconstructed from what is
found in the public sphere, there would be no knowing for sure what some-
one else meant. Quine famously remarks: 
Language is a social art which we all acquire on the evidence solely of
other people’s overt behaviour under publicly recognizable circum-
stances.
(Quine, 1969: p. 26)
The remark may taken as one way to construe Wittgenstein’s claim that
meaning is use. Certainly Quine accepts – along with Davidson, Dummett
and McDowell – that meaning cannot transcend use. But the stronger
conclusion – that facts about linguistic significance are to be 
 
located
 
 in the
public sphere – requires further argument. The argument Quine gives starts
from the idea that observable behaviour in observable circumstances is all
we have to go on in acquiring language from our surroundings, so any
appeal to meaning facts must attempt to locate them in what we display to
others in our observable behaviour in those circumstances. Of course, we
may wonder whether the behaviour of others 
 
is
 
 all we have to go on in learn-
ing a language, and why, even if this were the data, it would follow that the
linguistic facts we come to know could be found among, or reconstructed
from, that observable behaviour.
 
7
 
 He tells us that: 
In psychology one may or may not be a behaviourist, but in linguistics
one has no choice…. We depend strictly on overt behaviour in observ-
able circumstances…. There is nothing in linguistic meaning beyond
what is to be gleaned from overt behaviour in observable circum-
stances.
(Quine, 1990: pp. 37–8)
But this view commits us to a mistaken view of language acquisition. It
presumes that the child learning a language and the theorist of language are
in the same predicament, facing the same task and subject to the same
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evidential constraints. But this is false. The linguist, unlike the child, is not
trying to acquire the language by observation of the data, but trying, rather,
to explain how the child could have acquired her linguistic competence on
the basis of the evidence 
 
she
 
 was exposed to. The linguist attempts this on
the basis of specific hypotheses about the information the child is innately
endowed with that would enable her to map a particular course of linguistic
experience on to an elaborate ability to assign complex syntactic structures
to the sounds she produces and responds to: structures that go well beyond
the data. 
The problem, then, is to determine the innate endowment that serves
to bridge the gap between experience and knowledge attained.
(Chomsky, 1986: p. 38)
The special, dedicated component that enables the normally functioning
infant to acquire one of the possible human languages on the basis of
exposure to a course of experience is the language faculty. According to
Chomsky, this is a component of the mind/brain with which humans are
uniquely endowed. And so far it offers the only worked-out proposal about
how humans acquire grammatical knowledge of their first language. The
forlorn idea that we learn syntactic structure by analogy with the repetitious
learning of a manual skill is a non-starter and does not merit serious discus-
sion. There is no evidence that such repetitive practice takes place or that
mistakes of the kind expected in such training actually occur. What needs to
be explained, instead, is why a speaker who has had exposure to a limited
set of utterances can produce indefinitely many new ones and ‘distinguish a
certain set of “grammatical” utterances, among utterances that he has never
heard and might never produce’, and in doing so ‘projects his past linguistic
experience to include certain new utterances and exclude others’
(Chomsky, 1955: p. 61). The competence acquired by the child goes far
beyond the linguistic evidence she is exposed to, and poverty-of-stimulus
arguments show that generalizations about syntactically permissible struc-
tures of the adult language cannot be formed from the paucity of the data
available to the child.
 
8
 
 However, a sub-personal mechanism that projects in
accordance with the innate principles of grammar would explain how this is
possible. And inference to the best explanation – in this case the only expla-
nation – suggests that we should accept the linguist’s postulation of an
innate language faculty. Thus, the response to Quine is that behavioural
evidence is 
 
not
 
 the only basis – and 
 
could not be
 
 the only basis – on which
the child acquires a richly syntactically structured language that obeys
universal principles of grammar. It also suggests that the child and theorist
are not in the same predicament. The child is not forming hypotheses about
the properties of the language faculty that enable her to acquire a grammar
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of her language. She is simply exposed to linguistic data that trigger the
setting of certain parameters of permissible variation left open by the
universal grammar characterizing the initial state of all language users.
Likewise, the linguist is not limited to the behavioural evidence that
confronts the child. Evidence about the acquisition of language by speakers
exposed to quite different ranges of behavioural data can still bear on a
theory of how this child acquires language.
 
3 Against the Publicity of Syntax
 
To what extent can one consider syntax a property of either the public
sphere or one’s first-person awareness of linguistic content? Consider the
following: 
(1) Mary expects to feed herself.
(2) Mary expects the woman sitting up in bed to feed herself.
(3) I wonder who Mary expects to feed herself.
In (1), we take the reference of the reflexive pronoun ‘herself’ to be to the
subject ‘Mary’. The reflexive pronoun appears to depend for reference on
the nearest noun-phrase which agrees with it in number and gender
(cf. ‘Mary expects to feed her’, where the non-reflexive pronoun cannot
depend on a nearby noun-phrase). Thus in (2), the reflexive pronoun
depends referentially on the noun-phrase ‘the woman sitting up in bed’.
However, in (3), the reflexive pronoun ‘herself’ does not referentially
depend on ‘Mary’, and speakers never assume that it does; although they
may not know why. How are speakers able to know these facts? The
relevant generalizations are expressed in linguistic terms that are not
consciously accessible. The linguistic facts in question are best explained in
terms of the underlying structures assigned to expressions by speakers:
structures that are not carried around as sentences from one speech episode
to another but generated in response to sounds they encounter and derived
from interacting principles which govern the syntactic relations of the lexi-
cal items they deploy in particular combinations. On this account, language,
or at any rate syntax, is seen as a fully internalized module of the mind. No
radical interpreter or translator will get the facts right until he discovers an
explanatorily adequate syntax for the speaker: one that explains both how
the speaker could acquire his grammar and what he shares with all other
human language users.
While Quine’s views may be wrong about syntax, his insistence on what
is observable places useful stress on the publicity of lexical meaning. Were
meanings not publicly available, and recognizable from observable use of
expressions, communication could not succeed. But once again, this only
takes care of one side of the communicative exchange. We need to augment
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the third-personal viewpoint on others using a language with the speaker’s
own point of view. After all, speakers don’t just use words, they understand
them. So what, then, is Quine’s view of understanding? Well, even this is to
be accounted for solely in terms of use: 
understanding a word consists in knowing how to use it in sentences
and how to react to such sentences.
(Quine, 1990: p. 58)
Is this enough? Certainly, the behaviour which speakers exhibit in language
use may be a 
 
guide
 
 to their understanding, but it cannot 
 
constitute
 
 their
understanding. Knowing what a word means is not just having an ability to
use and react to it, unless, of course, use abilities have insides as well as
outsides.
 
9
 
 Behaving in certain ways cannot constitute, they can only reflect,
our knowledge of what we mean by our words. The moral is that outer states
stand in need of inner experiences.
We need an account of understanding a language in which what it is to
understand a language is (at least) to understand words of the language and
the way they can be legitimately combined to perform speech acts of various
kinds with particular contents. This requires knowledge of syntax and
knowledge of semantics. Knowledge of syntax is less problematic. Knowl-
edge of semantics, or at any rate knowledge of word meaning, is highly
problematic. How does an account of what I mean by my words serve in an
account of communication with you? Accounts restricted to 
 
what
 
 gets
communicated tend to leave out what it is for you and me, comprehend-
ingly, to mean what we do by the words with which we communicate.
We need an account of linguistic meaning that does justice both to its
inner and its outer dimensions. So in any adequate account of our dealings
with language, a way must be found to restore the first-person point of view
of the language user, and to reconcile what is immediately available to
speakers in their inner acts of comprehension with what is outwardly acces-
sible in their public practice and observable speech. Notice, however, that if
we accept the exteriorizing move that comes with the stronger reading of
publicity, the reconciliation between inner and outer becomes particularly
acute: for how can meaning be part of the mind of the speaker if it also lies
open to view on the surface of linguistic behaviour?
 
4 Is There a Tension between Publicity and First-Person Knowledge of 
Meaning?
 
Already it may appear that the public side to mind and meaning threatens
the possibility of linguistic and psychological self-knowledge. But appear-
ances to the contrary, the external dimension actually ensures that
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whether a subject is in a given mental state or means such and such by his
words is an objective matter, answerable to more than just the subject’s
own opinions. Thus the possibility of third-person knowledge serves as a
requirement on a satisfactory account of first-person knowledge: it is why
states that are immediately available to us as part of our inner world can
be credited with an objective reality over and above our immediate
impression of them. The hard problem is explaining how one’s immediate
impressions (of how things seem to one) can amount to knowledge of
objective, empirical facts – one’s being in certain publicly determinable
states of mind, or one’s uttering words with publicly interpretable
meanings. 
The problem arises when we try to square this objective and outward
aspect of the mental [and the meaningful] with the special way in
which we know our own minds [and meanings] from the first-person
perspective. How can states whose natures belong partly in the public
sphere be so readily available to us from the first-person point of
view?
(Smith, 1998: p. 392)
We are inclined to think of what we mean and think as being automatically
available to us as part of our inner lives. But now we see the other half of
the problem: 
How can the facts of mental life [including knowledge of meaning] be
part of the inner world of a subject if they are also objective facts
knowable by others on the basis of outwardly observable behaviour?
(Smith, 1998: p. 392)
The answer is that interpretation and the first-person perspective are
conjoint. The existence of a third-person perspective, that of an informed
interpreter, secures a certain objectivity for claims about the details of a
person’s language. There being facts to be known from the interpreter’s
point of view means that there are facts for the person to get hold of from
the first-person point of view. But what a fully satisfying account of our first-
person knowledge of meaning has to explain is why opinions about what we
mean, not arrived at by interpretation (i.e. not theoretically generated),
nonetheless coincide with how we can be interpreted by others (i.e. with the
pronouncements of interpretation theory). The only way to explain this, I
shall argue, is to acknowledge the role the first-person perspective plays
both in a speaker’s meaning something by what he says and in his under-
standing of others.
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5 Davidson and Wittgenstein on Following a Rule
 
So far I have stressed the importance of Wittgenstein’s thinking to the
emergence of the publicity thesis, but it is important to remember that
Wittgenstein himself never lost sight of the felt tension between the first-
and the third-person perspectives, or of the need to reconcile them. At §138
of 
 
Philosophical Investigations
 
, where he has been stressing the phenome-
non of the meaning of a word coming to mind all at once, he asks: how can
meaning be all there at once in the mind of a speaker if it is also the unfold-
ing of use through time? A solution to this question was never given, but the
materials for a solution lay in resolving the issues that come up under
the head of the rule-following considerations. For if the use of expressions
in the language were governed by rules, and individuals were capable of
following rules, then individuals could be said to grasp the rules that dictate
a pattern of use. The trouble is finding a suitable item to serve as the candi-
date piece of knowledge that informs the speaker what the rule requires of
him on any particular application. Wittgenstein tells us which explanations
won’t serve, but he offers nothing substantial to cast light on what this
knowledge does consist in. What matters for our purposes, however, is to
note that for all his insistence that meaning is use and nothing is hidden, he
did think it necessary to address the issue of how an individual speaker is
capable of participating in the rule-governed practice that amounts to using
a language.
Part of Wittgenstein’s problem arises because he conceives a language as
something that extends beyond the speaker, as something the speaker must
somehow get hold of. By contrast, the words of Davidson with which this
article began remind us of how firmly he held the view – which some believe
emerged only late in his thinking – that there is no such thing as language,
at least if language is conceived as a social practice shared by speakers of a
given community. Davidson’s picture is altogether different. Words do not
carry their meaning from one occasion to the next, nor do they provide a
common currency that several speakers can trade on. Instead, meaning is
made on each occasion of utterance, in an act of interpretation, by how we
understand others’ utterances and how we intend our utterances to be
understood. All there can be is particular uses of ‘written or acoustical prod-
ucts’, and our meaning something by them is a matter of how we can be
interpreted and how we intend to be interpreted on those occasions.
Davidson regards this insight as due to Quine, and he takes it to be Quine’s
way of interpreting Wittgenstein’s dictum that meaning is use.
This is a far cry from Wittgenstein’s own way of understanding the claim,
and from the way it is usually interpreted. And it is instructive to see the way
such different construals of meaning as use play out in the philosophies of
Davidson and Wittgenstein. But in spite of their differences both philoso-
phers do aim to cast light on the question: what is it for a speaker to mean
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something on an occasion by the sounds he utters? And both give answers
that commit them to the essentially public nature of linguistic meaning.
Wittgenstein’s answer is that a speaker means something by his ‘written
or acoustical products’ when his use of these signs or sounds belongs to a
social practice: a practice the individual cannot sustain in isolation, and
which is shared with other members of his linguistic community. These are
rule-governed practices, and what it is for an individual to mean something
by producing sounds is a matter of what it is for the individual speaker to be
following particular rules of the practice. The set of rules for the use of
words (and the combination of words) enshrined in the practice of the
linguistic community determines a shared, public language.
By contrast, Davidson thinks that there is no such thing as a language,
conceived as a shared set of public practices, and no rules or conventions for
speakers to subscribe to.
 
10
 
 Davidson’s lesson in ‘A Nice Derangement of
Epitaphs’ (1986) was that even if it were possible to specify a full set of rules
governing a language, speakers could depart from them and still be under-
stood. Davidson does think that meaning is publicly determined in a social
setting, but that it cannot rely on, let alone be constituted by, a social prac-
tice. But without Wittgenstein’s notion of rules and language, what does
Davidson have to offer to explain a speaker’s meaning something on an
occasion by the sounds he utters?
It may be thought that Davidson has nothing to say about 
 
the speaker’s
 
predicament or about how an individual comes to qualify for the interpreta-
tions a radical interpreter gives to his utterances. But this isn’t so. In the
later work, Davidson does attempt to say what it is about a speaker that
enables him to sustain interpretations of his sounds as utterances of mean-
ingful sentences. This is Davidson’s discussion of triangulation: a basic set-
up for communication where two speakers are responding to a common
object or event and to each other.
 
11
 
 Here, Davidson gives a partial account
of what it is that makes thought and language possible for an individual; an
account that focuses on the early learning situation of the child and the
parent or teacher. The set-up has two speakers triangulating. In a case of
triangulation, the child responds to objects and events while also reacting to
the parent or teacher’s responses (grouping them as similar) to the same
objects and events. And in similar fashion, the parent or teacher responds
to the objects and events the child responds to while reacting to the child’s
responses to those same objects and events. Because they have common
objects to respond to, each’s response comes to be about something in
shared public space and not a response that can be drawn more peripherally
or proximally in terms of each’s sensory stimulation. For they could not be
reacting to each other’s responses to internal sensory stimulations. The fact
of a common object of attention makes it the case that they are entitled to
take each other’s responses to be about the same thing, an object thought or
talked about. Thus Davidson sees the possibility of thinking or talking about
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the world as depending on the existence of another with whom one shares
the set-up for triangulation. Triangulation also provides a basic platform for
re-establishing a shared understanding when communication breaks down.
 
6 Davidson and Language Acquisition
 
It is interesting to note that in the absence of a shared language, triangula-
tion is meant to do for Davidson what rules and rule-following are
required to do for Wittgenstein – although the latter sees the speaker as
connecting not just with another but with an extending and continuing
practice that constitutes a shared language. Each appeals to his account to
explain what it is for a speaker to mean something by the words he uses on
a particular occasion. Wittgenstein’s account explains what goes on there
as part of a pattern that includes this and many other examples. Davidson
sees the single case as part of a more widespread ability to make sense of
ourselves and others from one action to the next. But if triangulation is to
offer the alternative to Wittgenstein’s rule-following account, it must also
deliver, albeit in a different way, a similarly comprehensive account of the
phenomena of meaningful speech. And whereas Wittgenstein does
consider the first-person perspective of the language user (and struggles to
reconcile it with the third-person point of view), Davidson’s triangulating
subjects are offered no such perspective or outlook on what they are doing.
When Wittgenstein has the speaker ask ‘What does the rule require of me
here?’, Davidson simply has each subject make similar responses to the
behaviour of the other. Somehow this puts his triangulating subjects in a
position to take advantage of their situation, to become thinkers or
language users, but we are never told how this is possible for them. Being
part of a triangulation, a largely behaviourist affair, is at most a necessary
condition for thought and language. What is needed, it seems, is to exploit
the experiential insides of the triangulating subjects. Davidson could see
no way to do so given how wary he is of the notion of experience and the
fact that he makes no room for it in his philosophy of mind. And yet, if we
take the experiencing subjects to be jointly attending to the object on
which they correlate their responses, both to it and to each other, there are
more possibilities for a satisfying explanation of how they come to mean
something and understand one another. It is particularly important to give
a greater role to the perspectives of the agents, since without the appeal to
a shared language, triangulation has to bear the greatest weight in David-
son’s account of what it is for a speaker to mean something by the sounds
he utters. Remember, there are only occasions of use and ways they can be
interpreted.
So just what goes on within the individual? What does his own grasp of
the meaning of his words consist in? To answer these questions we would
have to look to what takes place and what is achieved in the acquisition
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of word meaning by the language learner. And it is here, I think, that we
see a reversal of the usual assumption about Davidson’s overly third-
personal account of meaning and understanding. Instead, he provides a
key insight: 
Someone who is consciously teaching a beginner the use of a word
may think of herself as simply passing on a meaning that already
attaches to the word. But from the learner’s point of view, the word –
the sound – is being 
 
endowed
 
 with a meaning.
(Davidson, 2001: p. 14)
The insight is that for each speaker it is a matter of her 
 
investing
 
 the item
heard with meaning and not simply recognizing a meaning that already
attaches to it, let alone something there on the surface of other people’s
meaningful speech. The coordination of the minds of speaker and hearer,
teacher and learner, under conditions of joint attention is what connects the
mind of each to the other and ensures that the meaning the individual
hearer invests sounds with is tightly connected to, and in that sense utterly
dependent on, what is in the mind of the speaker/teacher (and of others
too). Coming to mean something is not just a matter of individuals acting in
isolation and happening, correctly as it were, to assume that others have
those same internal states of significance-investing experiences. They fix
meaning together under conditions of joint attention in which the child can
check and monitor the gaze of the parent and the object she visually attends
to.
 
12
 
7 First-Person Meaning and the Understanding of Others
 
In the actual situation in which I understand another I want to propose that
the first-person case – my knowing what I mean by my words – is basic, and
that I rely on this knowledge to know what 
 
you
 
 mean. This is crucial in the
order of acquisition: 
(A) I take my words to mean such and such.
(B) In hearing the words you utter, I take them to mean what I mean
by them.
How can we account for (A)? And how can we account for my entitlement
to knowledge of what you mean on the basis of (B)? Is there a satisfactory
treatment of the metaphysics and epistemology of meaning that makes the
first-person case basic in just this way? I think that there is and that it
depends on the following three components: 
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(i) an account of what it is for one to take words to mean what they do –
this requires joint attention and the coordination of experience
between child and adult;
(ii) an account of our epistemic entitlement to knowledge on the basis of
(B);
(iii) further empirical constraints including syntax.
In (ii) I have to make a transition from I to II: 
I I take you to mean M by your use of W.
II You mean M by your use of W.
How can we make a warranted transition from I to II? The answer is that
the move from I to II would be justified by III: 
III M is what anyone who uses W means by it.
But what justifies one in accepting III? It seems that it is only if I had safely
made transitions from I to II in enough cases that I could inductively
conclude that it was safe to accept III. And yet, each inference is risky. So
how do I secure any entitlement?
We cannot justify III by instances of justified transitions from I to II. Yet
there is no way to rely on the move from I to II without III. How can we? It
is the acceptance of III that warrants the required transitions, and the first
thing to acknowledge is that we do make these transitions. But the thing to
see is that our entitlement to III is automatic rather than supported by
empirical warrant. It is an assumption we cannot but accept from the outset
as our default. Without this presupposition (at least initially) our communi-
cative practices would not succeed. We are so constituted as to start by
taking everyone to be just like us in this respect: it is so basic an egocentric
outlook that it is not even supported by assumption or inference. This is
what we do at first by default.
 
13
 
 Instead of arriving at this conclusion by
inference I just assume that this is what W means: as if the word had that
meaning. As a child I take M to mean W by successfully endowing the
sound I’m given with meaning in the presence of a jointly attended-to
object. The perceptual experience I have and the coordination of that
experience with another mean that when a sound label is introduced with
that experience I can attach it to the object jointly attended to: it colours
the common or coordinated experience of the object. In this way, the
sound label commemorates that experience, and it helps to recreate that
experience on another occasion when the sound brings to mind the original
object-involving experience. If the child has attached a meaning to that
sound in the company of another person, she will, at first, have no reason
to distinguish the presence of that sound, whenever it is produced, from the
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meaning the word has for her. And so by default the meaning it has for the
child will not be distinguished from the meaning it has for anyone else. (It
is often a surprise to the monolingual child to discover that there are speak-
ers who 
 
cannot
 
 make something of the words she uses.) In this initial phase,
every hearing of the word will come with that meaning. And as far as the
child is concerned, that is just what the word means. The egocentrism of
the child serves her well at first and helps her to understand others on the
assumption that everybody is like her in this respect. In the default situa-
tion, anyone who uses W will be taken to mean M because that is what they
will be heard to mean. And as long as the default case is one in which the
child stays among people from whom she learned the word (and others
with whom they in turn are linguistically close), it will be safe to move from
I to II, by means of transitions so automatic they will not even count as
inferences.
An analogy that helps here is looking and seeing. Where there is a 
 
looking
 
by someone, there is a 
 
seeing
 
. I can’t have another person’s experience of
seeing, but if I observe them looking round quickly and I want to know what
they saw, I turn round and point my eyes in the direction of theirs (I look
there) and I read my experience for theirs. I take myself to be seeing what
they are seeing. And so long as we are sufficiently alike, and suitably placed,
this will be good enough. There is a similar connection between use and
understanding. They usually come together and are so connected that as
with looking and seeing we do not even make a conscious inference from
one to the other: we treat them as wedded together. But I can only observe
your uses of words, not enjoy your experience of understanding. In my own
case I simply speak with understanding of what I say; I don’t observe my
own use. But if, for me, my use of words comes with the understanding they
have for me, then whenever I encounter the use of these words, they will be
backed by the understanding I have of them. I shall at the outset use my
understanding of these words to understand you. (Who else’s understanding
should I use?)
To flesh out an account of how we come to mean something first-person-
ally, we would need to look at many factors that conjointly influence or
constrain the meanings we arrive at. These may be third-person (or at any
rate, second-person in the presence of another person) constraints on the
emergence or constitution of meaning. But constraints can come from
many sources. Some may be endogenous and have as their source not our
personal-level thinking and reasoning but our sub-personal system of
native endowments. Constraints on what we can mean as we come to use
words in sentences may come from syntax and even phonology. Syntax will
place constraints on what interpretations particular arrangements of words
can and cannot bear: which referential terms depend on others, as in exam-
ples (1)–(3) above, what scope certain expression have over others, and so
on; and phonology will constrain what range of sounds can count as the
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realization of a word. These constraints operate within individual language
users and affect their conscious experience of meaningful speech. Some of
them may be factors at work in all language users: that is to say, universal
features of the architecture of the human language system. Other
constraints will come from our personal level understanding of word mean-
ings and the way we use it to make immediate sense of what others are
saying. When this fails us we may resort to interpretation, or we may chose
words knowing how our interlocutors but not us will immediately interpret
them. At this stage we do become reflective interpreters of others, or, if
there is too little to go on, we triangulate with them by our communicative
responses. All these factors shape and characterize the conscious experi-
ence of language a speaker has in meaning what he does. An investigation
of these different aspects of speech may draw on the study of very different
aspects of our cognition, or our relation to others. The picture is richer and
more elaborate than most philosophers have appreciated; it requires atten-
tion to empirical studies, and there is a lot of work still to be done. David-
son has provided a powerful framework for thinking about these issues and
pointers to how the story could be developed further. Others will have to
take the project forward, but without his contribution we should have had
little idea of where to start.
 
Birkbeck College, University of London
 
Notes
 
1 A version of this paper was first presented in 2003 to the Philosophy of Language
Seminar of the Philosophy Programme in the University of London in honour of
Donald Davidson. I am grateful to the audience on that occasion. I am also very
grateful to Ophelia Deroy for incisive written comments and suggestions.The
ideas developed here were discussed with Donald Davidson and Marcia Cavell
on visits to Berkeley, These discussions were always a great source of pleasure
and encouragement and I benefited greatly from them; though I never budged
Davidson an inch in the direction I was recommending. I shall miss that fierce
but admonishing stare Davidson would deliver when I had clearly gone too far
in departing from his views. His strength of mind and the fundamental way he
had of thinking about issues and seeing connections between them will be widely
missed, but they will ensure his lasting impact on the subject.
2 The notions of word, word meaning, singular term, predicate, etc. are just theo-
retical concepts used in the construction of a theory for interpreting a person’s
speech (see Davidson, 1990: p. 300).
3 Despite important differences, McDowell and Dummett are at one on this point
and also close to Quine and Davidson.
4 For a clear and incisive discussion of this point see Pagin, 2000.
5 However, their views about the nature of meaning lead to differences between
them in where they locate the facts about meaning. For Davidson, the meanings
of people’s utterances are a matter of the 
 
gloss
 
 an interpreter can put on a
speaker’s linguistic behaviour. For Quine, on the other hand, meaning must be
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reconstructed from these behavioural materials. Quine is a behaviourist about
meaning, Davidson is not (or not quite). For Davidson linguistic meaning, or
rather interpretation, supervenes on behaviour.
6 We should add the qualification ‘by individuals suitably equipped to judge with
whom she communicates’.
7 In the end, all Quine can reconstruct from the meagre materials of behaviour,
physically described, is the notion of stimulus meaning.
8 The generalizations that explain linguistic data can only be characterized at
levels of linguistic structure remote from surface form.
9 Dummett, of course, comes close in a number of places to saying that the behav-
iour is which meaning is manifested amounts to what it is to know the meaning
of expressions. However, he also claims that speech is a conscious rational activ-
ity and that only those regularities consciously selected count as part of the
language. The thought here that abilities may be cognitive abilities with ‘insides’
as well as ‘outsides’ is perhaps what Dummett is after when he talks of linguistic
abilities as being more than merely practical abilities and as having an inelim-
inable theoretical component that guides as speaker as to which uses to make of
his expressions (see Dummett, ‘Language and Truth’, in Dummett, 1993:
pp. 117–46).
10 ‘If one speaker is to understand a second [this does] not suggest that the two
would need to speak the same language … it does not involve shared rules or
conventions’ (Davidson, 1992: p. 260).
11 See Davidson, 1982, 1992, 2001, and Glüer, 2006.
12 For convincing empirical evidence that it is only under these conditions that the
infant securely attaches a meaning or a word, see the work of Dare Baldwin
(1995).
13 The ideas here concerning our entitlement to knowledge of another’s meaning
adapts the epistemological framework provided by Crispin Wright in his discus-
sion of Wittgtenstein’s 
 
On Certainty
 
, in particular the role of hinge propositions
(see Wright, 1985 and 2004).
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